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The domestic politics of 
war and peace
Jimmy Carter, ronald reagan, 
 and the election of 1980
Robert Mason
on october 28, 1980, Jimmy Carter and ronald reagan met in Cleve-
land, ohio, for the only presidential debate of the campaign between the 
two major-party candidates. election day was just a week away, and opin-
ion polls suggested that both had a chance of victory. according to the 
latest gallup poll, the president had moved ahead of the former California 
governor by 45 to 42 percent; the louis harris poll had the same numbers 
but reagan ahead of Carter.1 in both camps (especially the president’s), 
there were aides who were not sure that participation in the debate was a 
wise move, but both candidates were confident in their ability to outper-
form their opponent.2
it would be reagan whose confidence proved to be the more pre-
scient. in his closing statement, he memorably pushed forward two key 
charges against Carter’s record, one based on economic performance, and 
one involving foreign policy. “are you better off than you were four years 
ago?” reagan asked americans. he alluded to inflation and mentioned 
unemployment—two pressing problems at home. he looked overseas as 
well: “is america as respected throughout the world as it was? do you 
feel that our security is as safe, that we’re as strong as we were four years 
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ago?” Just as memorably, in trying to advance one of his main arguments 
against reagan—that reagan was unlikely to be effective as president 
in maintaining peace—Carter had misfired, noting that he had asked 
his thirteen-year-old daughter amy what “the most important issue” was; 
her response, the president said, was “nuclear weaponry and the control 
of nuclear arms.”3 Carter’s supporters in the audience groaned; a panel of 
voters convened by the New York Times to discuss the debate erupted in 
laughter.4
at the polls a week later, americans gave the victory to reagan, unex-
pectedly by a landslide. in the popular vote, his margin over Carter was 
50.8 to 41.0 percent; John b. anderson, a disillusioned liberal republican 
running as an independent, picked up 6.6 percent. republican success in 
winning control of the senate for the first time since 1952, together with 
gains in the house of representatives, further encouraged the view that 
the 1980 elections marked a turn toward conservatism, perhaps even a 
realignment and the start of a new republican-dominated era in ameri-
can politics. This was an election in which foreign policy played a complex 
role, wrapped in perceptions of american decline. first, the background 
to the contest was a significant shift in public opinion on foreign policy, 
which became more supportive of interventionism. second, the Carter 
years witnessed a conservative revitalization that was partly grounded in 
a critique of apparent decline. and, third, as the white house incumbent 
at a time of economic challenges, Carter saw foreign policy as presenting 
his most promising case for reelection. all these factors boosted the sig-
nificance of foreign policy in the presidential contest even if the domestic 
dimension of decline—such as high unemployment and high inflation—
probably retained more influence on the outcome. This did not amount 
to an electoral realignment, but it did signal a desire for a new direction 
both at home and overseas.
Foreign Policy in 1980
election day in 1980 was the one-year anniversary of a landmark event 
for the United states overseas. on november 4, 1979, a group of iranian 
students took sixty-six americans hostage at the Us embassy in tehran; a 
year later, as americans went to the polls to choose among Carter, reagan, 
and anderson, fifty-two hostages remained in captivity. it was against the 
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backdrop of the hostage crisis that the 1980 presidential campaign took 
place. The crisis at first fostered support for Jimmy Carter in a striking 
example of the rally-’round-the-flag effect but in time raised questions 
about his leadership.5 Vividly and painfully exemplifying the limits of Us 
power overseas, the hostage crisis fed a resurgence in patriotic sentiment. 
as they followed the events, “most [americans],” the historian david far-
ber writes, “became increasingly certain of one thing: the United states 
had lost its way—economically, culturally, politically, and even militar-
ily.” despite the political cynicism that had taken hold during the 1970s 
in the shadow of Vietnam and watergate, “americans demonstrated both 
a sometimes fierce, even xenophobic nationalism and an emotional bond 
to their fellow americans held captive in iran.”6
as farber’s observation suggests, setbacks in foreign policy were far 
from the only aspect of the country’s problems under debate during the 
1980 campaign. The fortunes of the economy were especially salient. in 
real terms, family income on average was 5 percent lower in 1980 than 
it was on Carter’s arrival in the white house.7 inflation was high (run-
ning at more than 12 percent for 1980), and so was unemployment (eight 
million), together generating the challenge of “stagflation”; in early 1980, 
the “misery index” that added together the inflation and the unemploy-
ment rates reached its highest level since 1932, before easing somewhat. 
Under Carter, moreover, the country had experienced “the highest inter-
est rates since the Civil war,” reagan noted, and the prime rate stood at 
15.5 percent on election day. especially because of the energy crisis—
which involved a new dependence on foreign oil and which Carter labeled 
“the moral equivalent of war”—these economic challenges had a foreign 
dimension.8
despite the personal impact of stagflation for many americans, for-
eign policy was frequently at the forefront of political debate in 1980. rea-
gan often observed: “what this administration has done to the domestic 
economy is infinitesimal [compared] to what has been done on the inter-
national scene to this country of which we were once so proud.”9 such 
charges promoted the significance of foreign policy, but Carter and his 
supporters also played an important role in this regard, believing that this 
was a debate that favored their cause. “foreign policy was involved more 
prominently throughout the campaign than inflation,” noted the scholar 
Jonathan moore soon after the election, “and it played a more explicit role 
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in the behavior of candidates and the media.”10 The economic challenges 
facing the United states nevertheless ensured that the salience of unem-
ployment and inflation eclipsed that of foreign policy.11 a reagan aide 
remarked: “The media are more interested in [the war-and-peace issue] 
than the people themselves are.”12 still, this is not to say that interna-
tional questions were unimportant. a University of michigan study of 
public opinion reported that, while 56 percent of voters said that the most 
important issue was the economy, almost one in three named defense 
as the most important issue—a much higher proportion than in 1976.13 
according to stephen hess and michael nelson, a survey of presidential 
elections from 1952 to 1984 suggests that the 1980 contest was one of 
three in which foreign policy played “a significant role in the electorate’s 
decision process,” even if nonforeign issues were more important.14
it was not only the hostage crisis that fed this concern about foreign 
policy; in december 1979, the soviet Union invaded afghanistan, creat-
ing a situation that Carter named “the most serious foreign-policy crisis 
since world war ii.”15 in making such a comment, Carter succumbed to 
hyperbole, but the invasion’s political consequences were indeed signifi-
cant. “The invasion of afghanistan and its political aftermath,” notes the 
historian Julian Zelizer, “ended a decade-long quest among democrats 
and moderate republicans for a centrist national security agenda.”16 That 
quest had first, under richard nixon and then gerald ford, involved 
détente and a stress on negotiation with the soviet Union; on the demo-
cratic side, it then extended to Jimmy Carter’s emphasis on human rights 
as a defining characteristic of american foreign policy after Vietnam. “The 
defeat of the center in national security politics during the 1970s,” Zel-
izer concludes, “was a defining moment in the history of modern conser-
vatism.”17 This moment had implications for party politics and for policy 
making; while divisions on foreign policy deepened within the demo-
cratic party, the decline of détente fostered new unity among republicans.
The post-Vietnam years had been a period of transition in public 
opinion on foreign policy if also a period of public unconcern, relatively 
speaking, about international and defense matters.18 The Vietnam war 
had generated wariness of and skepticism toward american intervention 
overseas, but the foreign policy challenges of the Carter years encour-
aged a shift from dovishness to hawkishness. hostility toward the soviet 
Union, concern about the Cold war standing of the United states, and 
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support for higher spending on defense were all on the increase. polls 
suggested, for example, that in 1973 only about one in five americans 
held a highly unfavorable view of the soviet Union, but the proportion 
was one in three by 1980. “by the time of the 1980 presidential election,” 
the pollsters daniel Yankelovich and larry Kaagan noted, “fearing that 
america was losing control over its foreign affairs, voters were more than 
ready to exorcise the ghost of Vietnam and replace it with a new posture 
of american assertiveness.”19 when Carter’s pollster patrick Caddell con-
ducted interview research about attitudes on arms limitation, he reported 
“a general concern” about foreign and defense questions: “Nothing in our 
structured quantitative research prepared us for the below surface anxiety and 
concern over these issues that the open end interviews revealed,” he wrote.20 
Yet, although Carter’s record in foreign policy and his management of the 
hostage crisis in particular fostered dissatisfaction with his administra-
tion, most americans remained generally supportive of his measured and 
cautious approach to that crisis. an october poll, moreover, gave him a 
53 to 52 percent edge over reagan as the candidate “best able to keep us 
out of war.”21
while the hostage crisis in iran and the soviet invasion of afghani-
stan encouraged public concern about america’s world standing, these 
developments did not initiate but merely confirmed a conservative trend 
in opinion on foreign policy that had been building during the second 
half of the 1970s. “for those who wish to argue that the 1980 election 
really was preceded by a shift to the right,” writes the political scientist 
william g. mayer, “attitudes about foreign policy must clearly rank as 
exhibit a.”22 for mayer, this evolution in public opinion is significant 
especially because a rightward shift is not similarly visible in other policy 
areas, such as economic/welfare issues and social issues. according to gal-
lup, the number of voters describing themselves as right of center was no 
higher in 1980 than in 1976, and louis harris noted a decline since 1968 
in the number of self-identified conservatives.23
The conservative resurgence
Concerns about american weakness overseas, together with economic and 
cultural themes, helped inform the organizational and intellectual resur-
gence of conservatism during the 1970s. staunch anticommunism had 
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been a founding characteristic of modern american conservatism during 
the 1950s, and then barry goldwater’s quest for the presidency in 1964 
partly rested on a fundamental critique of existing Cold war policy—
which his opponents (among republicans as well as democrats) branded, 
all too successfully, as dangerous and irresponsible. during the nixon 
administration, conservative dissatisfaction with the policies of détente 
and especially with the opening to China was great enough that a group 
of leading figures on the right supported an insurgent challenge, by rep-
resentative John ashbrook of ohio, to nixon’s renomination in 1972. 
four years later, ronald reagan found that attacks on détente energized 
republican support for his challenge to gerald ford for the presidential 
nomination more powerfully than did other issues.24
among reagan’s most wounding attack lines targeting ford in 1976 
was one that questioned the administration’s negotiations on the future of 
the panama Canal Zone. “when it comes to the Canal,” reagan said, “we 
built it, we paid for it, it’s ours, and we should tell [panamanian dictator 
omar] torrijos and Company that we are going to keep it!” in november 
1977, richard Viguerie, a leading figure of the “new right,” called the 
question of the Canal treaty’s ratification, somewhat hyperbolically, “the 
most electrifying issue conservatives have ever had.”25 new right orga-
nizations energetically pursued an antiratification campaign that added 
400,000 names to the lists that Viguerie maintained to support their sig-
nature tactic of direct mail. anticommunism also mobilized conservative 
evangelicals and fundamentalists; criticizing the strategic arms limita-
tion talks (salt)—which led to the salt ii treaty, signed in June 
1979—sandra ostbyu of Christian Voice explained that this was a posi-
tion that formed “part of our attitude toward godless communism.”26 The 
decline of détente and the foreign policy travails of the Carter adminis-
tration not only buoyed the organizational revitalization of conservatism 
but also fostered unity on the right both within and beyond the repub-
lican party. whereas moderate republicans had opposed goldwater on 
Cold war policy and conservative republicans had challenged nixon on 
détente, a new degree of agreement was now visible.27
grassroots mobilization in support of a conservative foreign policy 
alternative found voice when in 1978 the new right supported challenges 
to congressional supporters of the Canal treaties, both in primaries and 
in general elections. This signature issue of a new conservatism in foreign 
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policy apparently proved less powerful than its promoters claimed, how-
ever. it seemed significant only in gordon humphrey’s defeat of senator 
tom mcintyre in new hampshire and, later, in 1980, in John p. east’s 
defeat of senator robert b. morgan in north Carolina.28 as the political 
scientist byron shafer notes, the presidency has more relevance to foreign 
policy than Congress does, and this institutional fact has consequences 
for electoral politics—diminishing the likelihood that a question of for-
eign policy shapes outcomes in congressional elections while maximizing 
its impact in contests for the white house.29
among the sternest critics of Carter’s foreign policy were neoconser-
vatives. neoconservatives were in most cases formerly loyal democrats 
who now believed that, in the aftermath of Vietnam, the party was drift-
ing toward a policy of weakness against the expansionist threat of com-
munism. The Coalition for a democratic majority, established at the end 
of 1972 in the aftermath of richard nixon’s landslide victory, sought to 
mobilize centrist democrats against the “new politics” associated with 
mcgovern. while neoconservatism had first emerged mostly in criticism 
of great society liberalism at home, in the 1970s neoconservatives increas-
ingly concentrated on foreign policy. The historian Justin Vaïsse identi-
fies a fivefold agenda that pushed them to dissent during the Carter years, 
despite the post–afghan invasion turn to toughness: to defend democracy; 
to promote human rights; to assert america’s military power; to support 
israel; and to attach less significance to multilateralism and the United 
nations. This led to what Vaïsse labels a “‘migration’ to the right,” against 
Carter and in support of reagan on foreign policy, within neoconserva-
tism. neoconservatives did not necessarily voice this support publicly, and 
some would return to the democratic fold, but the transition was conse-
quential in the long term for conservatism and for the republican par-
ty’s approach to foreign policy.30 although neoconservative dissatisfaction 
with Carter was an elite response to trends within the democratic party, 
in fashioning an appeal to a wider public reagan harnessed the claim 
that the administration—“dominated . . . by the mcgovernite wing of 
the party”—had turned away from democratic party tradition. “i do not 
believe,” he said, “this administration’s defense policies are representative 
of the thinking of millions of rank-and-file democratic party members.”31
Yet the new conservatism carried dangers as well as advantages. The 
ardent anticommunism that inspired conservative activism threatened 
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to alienate voters of a more moderate stripe. as he prepared his presi-
dential campaign, ronald reagan was careful to restrain his rhetoric; in 
mid-1979, the New York Times noted that he offered “a calm, reasoned, 
and even dull speech.”32 The goal to avoid an extremist tag animated the 
reagan campaign. reagan’s pollster richard wirthlin wrote in march 
1980: “we must position the governor, in these early stages, so that he 
is viewed as less dangerous in the foreign affairs area, more competent in 
the economic area, more compassionate on the domestic issues and less 
of a conservative zealot than his opponents and the press now paint him 
to be.”33 on the campaign trail, reagan projected a message of “peace 
through strength” that synthesized the case for military buildup with the 
claim that such policies made war less likely, not more likely.34 a study by 
Kiron K. skinner, serhiy Kudelia, bruce bueno de mesquita, and Con-
doleezza rice concludes that reagan’s message posed a challenge to exist-
ing assumptions of Cold war policy: “reagan was campaigning on the 
radical notion that the american conventions of containment and deter-
rence were wrongheaded and had relegated the country to second-place 
status.”35 The Carter administration, reagan said, was “totally oblivious” 
to Communist expansionism, offering a response “of weakness, inconsis-
tency, vacillation and bluff.” what he promised instead was a “prudent 
and measured” buildup of national defenses, alongside an emphasis on 
the need for negotiation with the soviet Union.36 he stressed, too, a com-
mitment to “a balanced and equitable arms limitation agreement,” which 
stronger defenses would facilitate: “The way to avoid an arms race is not 
simply to let the soviets race ahead.”37
carter’s Foreign Policy challenges
if reagan used his candidacy to advance an argument about Cold war 
policy, then the administration’s difficult record shaped Jimmy Carter’s 
quest to retain the white house. in 1979, Carter reached new depths 
of popularity, his gallup ratings even worse than richard nixon’s had 
been just before his resignation.38 The focus of public dissatisfaction 
involved the country’s economic travails—high unemployment, high 
inflation, high energy prices—together with the perception that Carter 
was a weak, ineffectual leader. foreign policy was not, directly, a factor. 
Yet the Cbs/New York Times poll only once reported majority approval 
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of Carter’s conduct of foreign policy, which was in response to the Camp 
david accords of september 1978.39 paradoxically, pollsters reported sup-
port for the constituent elements of Carter’s foreign policy, including not 
only middle east peace efforts but also talks on arms limitation with the 
soviet Union, increases in defense spending, and diplomatic recognition 
of China. Connected with this dissatisfaction was a widespread belief that 
america’s standing in the world was poor and weakening.40 believing that 
the democrats’ old new deal coalition was crumbling, Carter thought 
that conservative aspects of his agenda, including increased spending on 
defense, might complement its liberal aspects, including arms control and 
his human rights focus, and offer “hopes of building upon the old demo-
cratic coalition and broadening it somewhat.”41
Carter’s response to foreign policy challenges delivered electoral ben-
efits in boosting his ability to withstand a challenge to his renomination 
from senator edward m. Kennedy of massachusetts. formally launching 
his candidacy just two days after the seizure of the hostages, Kennedy first 
experienced difficulty in criticizing Carter, who was initially the benefi-
ciary of a significant rally-’round-the-flag effect. when, in early decem-
ber, Kennedy questioned Carter’s decision to allow mohammad reza 
pahlavi, the deposed shah, to enter the United states for medical treat-
ment, the public response was hostile. Carter announced that he would 
not engage in nomination politics and instead concentrate on his white 
house duties; while initially the results were beneficial in boosting his rat-
ings for presidential leadership, over time, as overseas crises and domes-
tic problems persisted and accumulated, the Kennedy challenge gained 
force. he won a series of states that included michigan, new York, and 
pennsylvania, adding, on the last day of primary season, California and 
new Jersey.42 even though Carter survived the Kennedy challenge, the 
wounds inflicted by party division were lasting. “my main handicap for 
re-election,” Carter later said, “came from the liberal wing of the demo-
cratic party”—mobilized by the Kennedy candidacy.43 according to the 
Carter aide hamilton Jordan, that candidacy “was the single critical fac-
tor in [Carter’s] defeat.”44
The challenges in foreign policy that Carter faced encouraged him 
to move away from his stress on human rights and toward an empha-
sis on toughness. soon after the afghan invasion, he withdrew the con-
troversy-beset salt ii agreement from senate consideration. Then, in 
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July 1980, he signed presidential directive 59 (pd-59), which called for 
a buildup in nuclear arms and sought to replace the doctrine of mutually 
assured destruction that had long informed the country’s nuclear policy 
as a response to the soviet Union’s enhanced ability to engage in limited 
warfare against military targets. soviet officials interpreted pd-59 as one 
among other developments signaling a new era of confrontation in the 
Cold war; at home, some saw it as a political response to the charge in 
the republican platform that administration policy offered “a hobson’s 
choice between mass mutual suicide and surrender.”45 even though the 
president now supported increased spending on defense, a position in line 
with public sentiment, many believed that he did not—exemplifying the 
depth of the perception that he was weak on defense.46
an incumbent’s bid for reelection usually relies on, most of all, a ref-
erendum on the record. because voters saw the president’s record as weak, 
the Carter campaign sought to define the contest not as a referendum 
but as a choice between two candidacies, stressing that the republican 
challenger was unqualified for the white house. The effort to place rea-
gan’s putative inadequacies at the heart of the campaign often involved 
foreign policy because this was potentially the most wounding attack on 
his qualifications to be president. although Carter’s response to overseas 
crises had boosted his standing, by summer 1980 this hardly represented 
a strong argument for his reelection. “to the public,” Caddell noted in 
June, “american foreign policy appears in disarray—the hostages are still 
captive, the russians seem on the move and while there is a deep appre-
hension over armed conflict, a sense of political and military decline per-
vades the public mood.”47 polls conducted after the republican national 
convention in July gave reagan a two-to-one edge over Carter.48 Yet, if 
Carter succeeded in pushing reagan on the defensive over the issue of 
peace and war as “the central issue of the campaign, the guy loses big,” 
an aide said in september—by which time Carter had taken the lead.49 
surveying presidential contests between 1956 and 1988, the political sci-
entist John Kenneth white notes that Carter’s success in achieving better 
poll ratings on foreign policy than his republican rival was unusual for 
a democrat during the Cold war era—an achievement bettered only by 
lyndon Johnson in 1964.50
Carter’s acceptance speech, at new York’s madison square garden 
in august, signaled the thrust of attack. he said that victory for rea-
260 robert mason
gan posed “the risk of an uncontrollable, unaffordable, and unwinnable 
nuclear arms race” and an “alarming, even perilous destiny.” on the cam-
paign trail, he made the point yet more starkly, observing that the elec-
tion “will help to decide whether we have war or peace,” and noting that 
voters faced “an awesome choice.”51 opening his campaign against rea-
gan on labor day in tuscumba, alabama, he connected the message 
with an effort to maintain the support of his native south. “we south-
erners believe in the nobility of courage on the battlefield,” he said. “and 
because we understand the costs of war, we also believe in the nobility 
of peace.”52 reagan’s policies, he said in early october, were “an excel-
lent way to lead our country toward war.”53 Carter claimed that reagan 
showed a “repeated habit” of advocating american military intervention 
“when the obvious judgment made by [Carter himself] and by nixon and 
ford and Johnson and Kennedy and eisenhower and truman has been 
to avoid conflicts.”54 Complementing this “trigger-happy” charge was the 
claim that, as president, reagan would also foment division at home.55
The aggression of Carter’s anti-reagan rhetoric seemed counterpro-
ductive, precipitating a charge of meanness, and helping undermine the 
positive personal evaluations that were among his strengths. according 
to reagan, Carter was “reaching a point of hysteria that is hard to under-
stand”; he said that he “was deeply saddened . . . that the president would 
stoop so low.” according to richard wirthlin: “if we had tried to use our 
advertising to depict him as dishonest and mean, we could not have done 
the job he did on himself.”56 Yet Carter seemed to have few other options; 
fostering doubt about reagan on foreign policy was a key strand of his 
strategy. nevertheless, when leading Carter surrogates had attempted to 
carry the message, the efforts had secured little attention and therefore 
had had little impact. while the meanness charge elicited a pledge from 
Carter that he would speak “with more reticence” in future, opinion polls 
suggested that the strategy was hitting its target, despite some cost for 
popular evaluations of the president.57 according to polls, by mid-octo-
ber Carter had won back support among skeptical democratic and inde-
pendent voters to achieve parity in the race with reagan. not only had 
his attack impetus fostered concerns about reagan’s ability to maintain 
peace, but it was also apparently hindering his effort to reap the electoral 
advantage of dissatisfaction with the state of the economy.58 “The subur-
ban mommies don’t want their little boys to go to war, so they won’t vote 
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for reagan,” said one democrat.59 exemplifying such opinion, a woman 
in the detroit suburbs commented: “reagan might end the recession real 
fast, but we’d be in world war iii quickly.”60
Confronting the reagan campaign, richard wirthlin noted, was 
“the perceptual dilemma that large numbers of voters now wrestle with”: 
“on the one hand, reagan would be a strong and decisive leader in for-
eign affairs (which ‘we’ applaud), but on the other hand, he would be too 
quick to push the nuclear button (which ‘we’ fear and abhor).” he coun-
seled a stress on peace.61 as the New York Times journalist hedrick smith 
noted, the campaign sought to project reagan as a pragmatic, “compas-
sionate” republican, as “strong but not trigger-happy, firm but not bellig-
erent, positive but not divisive, calm but in command.”62 in his acceptance 
speech, reagan emphasized peace alongside an attack on the administra-
tion’s record. “never before in our history have americans been called 
upon to face three grave threats to our very existence, any one of which 
could destroy us,” he said. “we face a disintegrating economy, a weakened 
defense and an energy policy based on the sharing of scarcity.” he added: 
“today, a great many who trusted mr. Carter wonder if we can survive 
the Carter policies of national defense.”63
a series of missteps and gaffes threatened to reinforce Carter’s case 
that reagan lacked presidential ability. notably, before the Veterans of 
foreign wars convention in august, he referred to the Vietnam war as a 
“noble cause.” hindsight suggests that the phrase astutely connected with 
a desire to recover pride in the american mission, yet contemporaries usu-
ally saw the comment as “an attempt to open up national wounds that 
had scarcely healed,” as the journalists Jules witcover and Jack germond 
observed.64 The impetus of the Carter campaign, as notably exemplified 
by its commercials, sought to push home the advantages of incumbency 
and the doubts about reagan by emphasizing the weighty responsibilities 
of the white house and the responsibility for nuclear warfare in particu-
lar. according to the reagan aide lyn nofziger: “we’re running against 
Carter on the economy, and we’re trying to make reagan into a man of 
peace.”65 That strategy achieved perhaps its greatest success during the tele-
vision debate with Carter. “reagan mentioned ‘peace’ so often it sounded 
like he had invented the word,” wrote the journalist lou Cannon.66
after the debate, reagan’s poll ratings improved, but volatility 
remained a characteristic of the campaign. This was a campaign in which 
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many americans fixed their voting choice at an unusually late point in 
the campaign; the gallup postelection poll suggested that as many as 37 
percent made their decision during the last week, and for one in ten this 
was on election day itself.67 The last days of the campaign were espe-
cially volatile when, in the aftermath of the Carter-reagan debate, there 
was a potential breakthrough in the quest to secure the release of the hos-
tages. The columnist william safire, supportive of the republicans, sting-
ingly wrote that iran’s leader, ayatollah Khomeini—“the religious fanatic 
who hates us all”—“has cast his vote for Jimmy Carter, seeking to swing 
the Us election to a man he knows he can continue to control.”68 Carter 
believed that this was a crucial moment. “now my political future might 
well be determined by irrational people on the other side of the world over 
whom i had no control,” he wrote in his memoirs. “if the hostages were 
released, i was convinced my reelection would be assured; if the expecta-
tions of the american people were dashed again, there was little chance 
that i could win.”69 Caddell’s polling for Carter supported the view that 
end-of-campaign events proved crucial in the defeat: “The debate after-
math and the reentrance of the hostages issue focused critical attention 
on the Carter administration, specifically, for many previous uncertain 
voters, on economic management.”70 The effort to escape a referendum 
on the administration’s overall performance through a foreign policy–ori-
ented campaign, especially focusing on reagan’s deficiencies, had failed. 
in the reagan camp, wirthlin agreed that the election represented a refer-
endum on Carter’s record, especially with respect to the economy, though 
he disagreed that the president had a chance to win reelection until the 
breakthrough in the hostage crisis proved abortive.71 reagan aides had 
nevertheless long feared that an “october surprise”—resolving the hos-
tage crisis—might ruin their candidate’s chances.72
it was not only the fast-moving events of the campaign year that lent 
volatility to the Carter-reagan contest. a key reason for this volatility was 
the failure of both Carter and reagan to inspire much enthusiasm among 
many voters. “The 1980 presidential election,” noted the political scientist 
Thomas Cronin, “is being treated as almost as unwelcome an event as the 
attack on pearl harbor.”73 gallup reported that, in october, just 23 per-
cent of poll respondents had a “highly favorable” opinion of reagan and 
that Carter’s favorability rating was little better, at 30 percent. accord-
ing to a roper postelection poll, only 21 percent of Carter voters and 43 
The domestic politics of war and peace 263
percent of reagan voters reported “a good deal of enthusiasm” for their 
candidate.74
supporting the views of Caddell and wirthlin, pollsters for the 
candidates, most analysis of the 1980 presidential election emphasizes 
dissatisfaction with the Carter record as the key factor explaining rea-
gan’s victory. such analysis, moreover, usually attributes more electoral 
power to economic factors than to issues of foreign policy. This is not 
to suggest, however, that ideas about foreign policy did not distinguish 
reagan voters from Carter voters. The New York Times exit poll found 
that a majority of respondents favored a tougher line against the soviet 
Union, even if increasing the risk of war; of this group, 70 percent voted 
for ronald reagan, while Carter had a 64 percent share of the minor-
ity that disagreed.75 moreover, polls suggested that voters perceived 
greater differences between Carter and reagan on foreign issues than on 
domestic issues.76 modeling presidential approval ratings between 1977 
and 1987, the political scientists miroslav nincic and barbara hinck-
ley assert that a 1 percent increase in a president’s overall rating was the 
product of a 1.5 percent increase in approval on economic policy and of 
a 3 percent increase in approval on foreign policy. This is a conclusion 
that acknowledges the greater impact of public opinion on the economy 
but nevertheless underlines the significance of foreign policy in influ-
encing a president’s popularity. as a result, according to nincic and 
hinckley, most observers “underestimated the impact of foreign pol-
icy evaluations, which we now see was sizable.” They furthermore note 
that the hostage issue was more likely to influence Carter’s approval rat-
ings among democratic supporters, whereas, for republican and inde-
pendent voters, relations with the soviet Union were more important.77 
another study in political science, by John h. aldrich, John l. sullivan, 
and eugene borgida, similarly concludes that the existence of large dif-
ferences on foreign policy between the candidates coincided with a con-
text of high salience for such issues in 1980, overall generating a large 
effect on the election.78
conclusion
The 1980 election results showed that Carter’s effort to hold together 
the democratic coalition had failed, though his success in remaining 
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competitive through the campaign and sometimes in achieving a lead 
in the polls was an impressive achievement, given that the context for 
the incumbent was the least promising since herbert hoover sought 
reelection in 1932.79 perhaps the most notable demographic shift in vot-
ing behavior was one for which foreign policy seemed important: the 
movement of men toward the republican party.80 The 1980 presiden-
tial election marked the emergence of the modern gender gap in amer-
ican politics, sometimes interpreted then as a transient phenomenon, 
but soon consolidated as an enduring aspect of electoral behavior; the 
Cbs/New York Times exit poll reported that 56 percent of male voters 
but only 47 percent of female voters supported reagan.81 it was a trend 
that had been noticed during the campaign, inviting strategic responses. 
reagan pledged to nominate the first female supreme Court justice, a 
pledge designed to tackle the gender disparity in support that opinion 
polls were revealing.82 Carter’s pollster pat Caddell identified “human 
issues—peace, human rights, women’s rights, justice for minorities”—as 
“‘ feminine’ issues,” and he argued that they involved an area of strength 
for the president; conversely, “a perceived lack of Presidential decisiveness 
on masculine issues” was a weakness.83 two sets of issues seemed impor-
tant in explaining reagan’s relative lack of appeal among women; the 
first involved antifeminism, epitomized by the party’s failure to embrace 
a platform commitment to the equal rights amendment, and the sec-
ond involved his warmonger image.84 Yet analysis of exit polling down-
played the former in favor of the latter, suggesting that issues of war and 
peace primarily informed the appearance of the gender gap.85 such an 
insight was in line with earlier manifestations of gender disparities in 
voting that had involved greater support among women for republican 
candidacies, often connected with foreign policy and defense.86 This was 
probably, at least in part, a misperception; aides in the reagan white 
house soon concluded that views on the economy and the welfare state 
as well as on foreign policy informed the gender gap.87 in summer 1982, 
richard wirthlin noted that approval ratings for reagan’s foreign pol-
icy were at 62 percent among men but just 45 percent among women, 
but he subsequently discovered both that the gender gap seemed volatile 
and that the contribution of foreign policy, as distinct from other issues 
and concerns, was relatively minor.88
more broadly, the reagan years saw the revitalization of the repub-
The domestic politics of war and peace 265
lican party. even if reagan did not succeed in mobilizing enduringly 
an electoral majority in support of his party, republicans achieved what 
wirthlin labeled “parity” status with the democrats.89 reagan pursued 
military buildup, increasing spending on defense while making cuts else-
where, but he also pursued negotiation with the soviet Union, proving to 
be more pragmatic than his tough words sometimes suggested. “while 
the iran-Contra scandal and several of the reagan administration’s other 
adventures in the third world, as well as the massive deficits accrued by 
the herculean defense buildup, gave liberal critics ample ammunition for 
battling reagan’s conservative national security legacy, the american 
public, by and large, believed in reagan’s big picture: america was the 
world’s ‘indispensable’ superpower,” writes david farber. moreover, far-
ber adds: “reagan’s presidency gave conservatives a national security plat-
form they were thrilled to build on.”90 reagan’s america, furthermore, 
involved a celebration of patriotism, perhaps especially evident at the los 
angeles olympics of 1984 and in reagan’s reelection campaign.91 foreign 
policy contributed to reagan’s popularity as president.92 Yet the rightward 
trend in public opinion on foreign policy of the late 1970s did not last 
long. “The trend in foreign policy attitudes,” notes william mayer, “was 
clearly in a liberal direction through most of the 1980s.” The reagan years 
witnessed a decline in the proportion of americans who saw the soviet 
Union as enjoying military superiority, and support for more spending on 
defense declined. it is a trend that can be interpreted as a signal of public 
support for the reagan agenda on the Cold war in tackling the insecuri-
ties of the late 1970s.93
The election of 1980, then, was a watershed in american politics, 
marking the rejection of Jimmy Carter rather than an electoral embrace 
of ronald reagan and the republican party. during that election year, 
foreign policy often dominated the headlines, yet the electoral salience of 
hard times still eclipsed that of overseas challenges. even though public 
opinion on foreign policy was moving rightward, especially under the 
shock of “america’s first encounter with radical islam” and an apparent 
advance by the soviet Union in the Cold war, the president saw a foreign 
policy–grounded appeal as offering his best chance of retaining the white 
house.94 Yet reagan managed to escape the effort to cast him as a danger-
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